This paper develops a continuous time asset pricing model of debt and equity in a framework where equityholders decide when to default but creditors decide when to liquidate. This framework is relevant for environments where creditors exert a significant influence on the timing of liquidation, such as those of countries with creditor-friendly bankruptcy regimes, or in the case of secured debt. The interaction between the decisions of equityholders and creditors introduces an agency problem whereby equityholders default too early and creditors subsequently liquidate too early. Our model allows us to assess quantitatively how this problem affects the timing of default and liquidation, optimal capital structure, and spreads.
Introduction
In much of the continuous-time debt pricing literature, it has typically been assumed that default is tantamount to liquidation. In the models of Leland (1994) and Leland and Toft (1996) , for example, equityholders choose a boundary at which they will default, knowing that once they do so, the firm is immediately liquidated.
In practice most of the companies which default go into a period of reorganization and may or may not be liquidated.
1 Using US data, Gilson et al. (1990) find that in their sample only about 5% of the bankruptcies in Chapter 11 are converted into Chapter 7 liquidations. Using data on distressed UK companies, Franks and Sussman (2005) find no evidence of automatic liquidation upon default.
Recently, some debt pricing models have therefore attempted to separate the notions of default and liquidation. For instance, in the model by François and Morellec (2004) , default is triggered by the equityholders but the company is liquidated only once the consecutive time spent in default exceeds an exogenous grace period. Similarly, in the model of Moraux (2002) liquidation occurs when the cumulative time spent in default exceeds an exogenous grace period, and in the model of Galai et al. (2007) , liquidation occurs when consecutive time in distress, weighted by distress severity exceeds an exogenous threshold.
2 In all of these papers, default is determined by equityholders but liquidation is triggered by an exogenous criterion which is meant to capture the Court's behavior under Chapter 11. This paper contributes to this literature by considering an alternative, endogenous mechanism for liquidation, which is more representative of creditor-friendly bankruptcy regimes or secured debt: Once equityholders have defaulted, debt covenants are triggered, which give debtholders the option to liquidate the firm. In our setup, debtholders do not liquidate the firm immediately upon default but are willing to accept reduced coupon payments (i.e. some default on coupon payments) in the hope that the firm's fundamentals will improve. If the firm's fundamentals deteriorate, however, debtholders eventually liquidate. The point at which equityholders default furthermore affects the incentives to liquidate; the earlier equityholders default, the lower the continuation value to debtholders, and hence the earlier they will want to liquidate. Equityholders, when choosing when to default, take into account how their default decision affects the liquidation decision of debtholders.
This produces very different implications for the timing of liquidation-as opposed to models with an exogenous grace period, the time of liquidation can be very soon after default if firm fundamentals deteriorate sufficiently, or very long after default if firm fundamentals are bad but stable for a long time. In our model, the time between the initial default and subsequent liquidation will be random, and not related to a grace period.
Also, it implies that debtholders have incentives to liquidate too early, and equityholders have incentives to default too early, which affects debt values and optimal capital structures. Firstly, debtholders typically get all of the liquidation value but only a part of the upside to all claimants if the firm's situation improves. They therefore have incentives to liquidate early, decreasing firm value. Secondly, equityholders anticipate that debtholders will not liquidate immediately upon default. They therefore have incentives to default earlier than they would otherwise. If there is a cost associated with default/ financial distress, this cost is then more likely to be incurred, decreasing firm value. Both effects produce an agency cost, whose size is also affected by the interaction between the two decisions. We show in a numerical example how this can lead to lower optimal leverage and higher spreads.
Relative to the above-mentioned literature that considers liquidation as a result of exogenous grace periods, our model is a better representation of an environment where debtholders have a strong influence over the timing of liquidation, like in the case of secured debt, or creditor-friendly bankruptcy regimes. For instance, in the UK most banks hold a floating charge over the assets of a company and if the firm is unable to meet its obligations then the banks have the power to appoint an administrative receiver who then supervises the running of the firm and who has the power to put the company into liquidation.
3 The UK Bankruptcy Code closely resembles the South African "judicial management" and the Australian "official management" and gives relatively more powers to the creditors vis-a-vis the US Chapter 11.
Our model is also related to the work of Mella-Barral (1999) . In his setup, debtholders also do not liquidate immediately upon default but are willing to accept reduced coupon payments (i.e. some default on coupon payments) in the hope that the firm's fundamentals will improve. However, in his model whenever a default occurs new debt contracts are drawn up until the firm is eventually liquidated. In contrast, in our model, although debt contracts are temporarily violated when equityholders default on coupon payments, they are not renegotiated or replaced. (This is consistent with the US Trust Indenture Act of 1939 which prohibits firms from permanently changing the 'core' terms of bond indentures, which include the principal amount, the interest rate and the stated maturity, unless all the creditors agree unanimously.
4 ) The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the model. Section 3 reports the analytical solutions for the values of equity, debt, and the firm, taking the default and bankruptcy boundaries as given. Section 4 characterizes and discusses the optimal default and liquidation boundaries chosen by equityholders and debtholders respectively. Section 5 studies the implications of the model in the context of a numerical example. Section 6 concludes.
3 There is at least anecdotal evidence that as a result of debtholders being able to enforce liquidation in the UK, there are instances of premature liquidation. For example, Woolridge (1987) reports that floating charge holders "apply themselves ruthlessly to the realization of assets to satisfy the charge. . . in some cases with scant regard for the future of the company", or Hart (1995, p. 168) argues that "the bank may decide against keeping a good company going because it does not see the upside potential."
4 If the firm goes to Chapter 11, then these core terms can be altered if a two-thirds majority by value and a simple majority by number is reached within each class of creditors. However unanimity is required outside of Chapter 11.
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The Model
A firm has access to a production process which produces a stochastic cash flow x with two inputs: the human capital of a penniless manager, and a (physical) productive asset. Financiers set up a firm to become equityholders: they purchase the productive asset, hire a manager, 5 and finance part of the initial outlay by issuing perpetual debt 6 with a promised coupon payment of b > 0 per period, and part of it with their own wealth.
7 All potential managers have many outside job opportunities all paying a flow of a > 0, and therefore the manager needs to be paid a salary flow of a per instant of time. The manager's human capital can be interpreted as a technical skill which is valuable to the firm and without which the firm cannot be run. Hence if the manager's wage income is not paid, she leaves the firm and the firm produces no cash flow.
We suppose that capital markets are frictionless and that there are no informational asymmetries between agents. Interest rates are non-stochastic and flat at r.
8
Once a firm is operational, equityholders can decide whether or not to default on coupon payments. When equityholders do not default on coupon payments, they receive residual cash flows gross of taxes of x − (a + b), on which they are liable to pay taxes at a tax rate of τ per period, where τ ∈ (0, 1). Thus, the residual cash flows to equityholders net of taxes are given by (1 − τ )(x − (a + b)).
9 The payoff to the equityholders might be negative if the fundamental cash flow x is too low to cover both coupon payments and the salary of the manager.
When equityholders default on coupon payments, the fundamental cash flow is reduced to θx, where θ ∈ (0, 1) reflects the cost of financial distress. In default, debtholders receive the residual cash flows θx − a, where θx − a < b whilst equityholders receive nothing. Once a default occurs, debt covenants are triggered which gives debtholders the right to liquidate. This put option to liquidate may or may not be exercised by the debtholders.
10
5 We do not model principal-agent problems between the equityholders and the manager in this paper. Recently some continuous time pricing models have focused on managerial related agency problems. See, for instance, DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006) and Morellec and Smith (2007) .
6 For simplicity we assume that debt is perpetual. For an analysis of the effect of maturity on debt pricing, see, for instance, Dumitrescu (2007) and Leland and Toft (1996) .
7 As is commonly supposed in the literature we assume that the equityholders do not hold any debt in the firm. Realdon (2007) develops a structural valuation model when the equityholders are also debtholders and shows that equityholders expropriate other debtholders by repaying their own credit before bankruptcy.
8 Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) develop a simple model of debt pricing in which they drop the usual assumption of non-stochastic interest rates. However, like most other papers in the literature the focus of this paper is on default risk and hence we assume that interest rates are constant. 9 In the model, cash flows to debtholders are not taxed; τ should therefore be interpreted as a net tax advantage to debt in the sense of Miller (1977) .
10 Note that given this setup the equityholders will not have an incentive to default on coupon payments as long as the cash flows are sufficient to service debt. This is in contrast to the strategic debt servicing models of Anderson and Sundaresan (1996) and Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997) . In their models, equityholders default even at high cash flows to the extent that the payoff to the debtholders is just sufficient such that they do not have an incentive to liquidate the firm. This strategic debt service will not happen here because we require that equityholders cannot pay themselves a dividend when defaulting.
As argued by Jensen (1986) , one motivation for issuing debt is to commit the managers of the firm to pay out future cash flows. However for such an objective to be effective there has to be some punishment
In the event of liquidation the manager is fired, and the physical capital is sold for total proceeds of K. We assume that 0 < K < b r , and that absolute priority is respected in liquidation, such that all of the liquidation proceeds go to debtholders. Since the liquidation payoff to debtholders is less than b r , debt will be risky. Although for the main part of the paper we treat K as constant, the analysis can be generalized to a situation in which K is a function of x, as long as this function satisfies some conditions. Basically, these conditions boil down to requiring that in the case of an unlevered firm, there can be situations in which the going-concern value is so low that the firm is better off being liquidated and the remaining assets diverted to other uses, i.e. liquidation is optimal for a low enough firm value. It turns out that if this holds for an unlevered firm, it also holds for a levered firm. For our purposes, since we want to be able to discuss optimal versus suboptimal liquidation boundaries, we impose these conditions. Since a constant K is the simplest example for which these conditions are satisfied, this is the case which we treat in the main text. A full discussion of the case where K is a function of x is relegated to Appendix D.
The cash flows x follow a geometric Brownian motion under the pricing measure defined by the money market account, i.e.
where the parameters µ and σ represent the drift and volatility terms respectively and dW (t) is the increment of a Brownian motion under the pricing measure. Since debt and equity are perpetual claims, the optimal decision to default and the optimal decision to liquidate can be expressed in terms of optimally chosen constant boundaries for the cash flow at which equityholders default and debtholders liquidate. We letx denote the critical boundary at which equityholders choose to default, andx denote the critical boundary at which debtholders choose to liquidate. Equityholders will choosex to maximize the value of equity. They choose first, taking into account the effect that their choice ofx has on the choice of liquidation boundaryx by the debtholders (i.e. they act as Stackelberg leaders). Debtholders choosex to maximize the value of debt, takingx as given.
Valuation
In this section, we discuss the value of equity, debt, and the firm.
The value of equity
Equity is a perpetual claim to the cash flows (1 − τ )(x − a − b) outside of default, and 0 in default, until the firm is liquidated. The liquidation payoff to equity is zero. A standard pricing argument (requiring discounted gains processes to be martingales under the pricing measure Q) produces a pricing ordinary differential equation (ODE).
if the commitment is not fulfilled. This punishment can take various forms. In our model it is the shift of the control rights that gives force to this commitment. Hart and Moore (1998) show that such a characteristic of a debt contract which gives the lender the right to seize and liquidate the project upon default is useful in persuading entrepreneurs to pay out cash flows rather than diverting them.
The equity value E(x) solves the following ODE:
where
Let E 1 (x) be the value of equity in the no-default region, and E 2 (x) be the value of equity in the default region. Then the value of equity will obey the following boundary conditions:
Eqns. (5) and (7) are obvious value-matching conditions. Eqn. (4) rules out bubbles, and states that for very large cash flows, the firm should essentially be default-risk free. Eqn. (6) states the value function should not change abruptly when the flow payoff function changes. Dixit (1993) shows that this is a necessary condition for no arbitrage.
(See Karatzas and Shreve (1988) for a more rigorous discussion.) Solving the differential equation (2) subject to the above boundary conditions we obtain the following result.
Proposition 1. The value of equity in the no-default region is given by
(8) while the value of equity in the default region is given by
The powers δ and γ are the positive and negative roots respectively of the characteristic quadratic equation ξ (ξ − 1) σ 2 /2 + ξµ − r = 0. Finally, for x <x the value of equity is 0.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The value of equity in the no-default region, E 1 , can be interpreted as the value of receiving the cash flows net of coupons and taxes (the first term of (8)), plus the (negative) value of a claim that swaps this against E 2 when the firm enters the default region. The first term in (9) is the value of receiving positive cash flows in the event that 6 the firm exits the default region. The second term swaps this value against 0 whenx is hit and the firm is liquidated. The solution of the equity function from Proposition 1 is illustrated in Figure 1 . Note that the value of equity is often positive even in the default region even though the economic payoff to the equityholders in this region is zero. This is because as long as the firm is not liquidated, there is always a positive probability that the firm might exit default and hence the equity holders might be able to earn economic profits in the future.
The value of debt
The debt value solves the following ODE
Region 2: default
The liquidation payoff to debtholders is K. Let B 1 be the value of debt in Region 1, and let B 2 be the value of debt in Region 2. Then the value of corporate debt will satisfy the differential equation (10) subject to the following boundary conditions
B 2 (x) = K
As before, (13) and (15) are obvious value-matching conditions. Eqn. (12) rules out bubbles, and states that for very large cash flows, debt should essentially be default-risk free. Analogous to the equity pricing case, (14) rules out arbitrage opportunities.
Solving the differential equation (10) given the boundary conditions just described yields the following result.
Proposition 2. The value of debt in the no-default region is given by
while the value of debt in the default region is given by
(17) Finally, for x <x the value of debt is K.
As before, these formulas can be interpreted in terms of claims that swap values for other values when default and liquidation boundaries are hit.
The solution from Proposition 2 is depicted in Figure 1 . Note that as is the usual case, the value of debt is a concave function of the state variable in good states of the world. However, in the default region the value of debt is a convex function of the state variable reflecting the fact that the bondholders are in effect the residual claimants as long as the firm remains in default.
The market value of the levered firm
Given the market price of equity and the market price of debt we can calculate the market value of the levered firm, V , as the sum of the value of all outstanding claims.
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We define V 1 as being equal to the market value of the levered firm in the no-default region while V 2 denotes the market value of the levered firm in default region. Since V 1 = E 1 + B 1 and V 2 = E 2 + B 2 we have the following corollary to Propositions 1 and 2.
Corollary 1. The value of the levered firm in the no-default region is given by
while the value of the levered firm in the default region is given by
In the no-default region, the market value of the levered firm is the post-tax value of cash flows (net of manager salary), plus the value of the debt tax shield. The third term represents the value of a claim that swaps this against the market value of the levered firm in the default region, when x hitsx.
In the default region, the market value of the levered firm is the value of receiving the now untaxed cash flows, but subject to distress cost θ, net of manager salary (first two terms), plus the value associated with receiving the higher cash flows (not subject to distress cost) when x rises abovex (term in (Z(x) − Z(θx)) x x δ ), minus the value associated with having to pay taxes again once x rises abovex (second term). The fourth term represents the value of a claim that swaps this against K, when x hitsx.
The valuation function of the levered firm is depicted in Figure 1 . 
Optimal default and liquidation
In this section, we discuss the optimal default and liquidation thresholds chosen by equityholders and debtholders respectively. A natural point of comparison will turn out to be the default boundary at which equityholders would choose to default if default implied immediate liquidation as in Leland (1994) .
Optimal default boundary chosen by equityholders
Suppose that the liquidation boundaryx is below the default boundaryx, i.e. default does not imply immediate liquidation. It can then be shown that equityholders will inject some cash to delay default, but less so than in the case in which default implies immediate liquidation.
Proposition 3. If default does not imply immediate liquidation, the default boundarŷ x * that maximizes the value of equity satisfies the following inequality
where x † is the default boundary that maximizes the equity value for the case where default leads to immediate liquidation. 9
Proof. See Appendix C.2.
The optimal default boundaryx * can be characterized via the appropriate first order condition associated with maximizing the value of equity:
The first term in the above equation measures the direct effect of the choice of default boundaryx on the value of equity while the second term measures the indirect effect of the choice of default boundaryx on the liquidation boundary. The choice of default threshold affects the continuation value of debt and hence indirectly influences the debtholders' liquidation decision. Since equityholders are the Stackelberg leaders they take into account the indirect effect of default timing on the liquidation threshold when maximizing the value of equity. Note that the default boundary directly affects equity value via its effect on cash flows: Choosing a default boundary above a + b means giving up the positive cash flows x − (a + b) for some x, because equityholders cannot receive dividends while the firm is in default. On the other hand, choosing a default boundary below a + b means having to make positive injections a + b − x for some x. If we only consider these direct effects on cash flows, the optimal default point would be given byx = a + b.
Furthermore, the default boundary indirectly affects equity value via affecting the liquidation boundary chosen by debtholders,x * B . (As it turns out, increasing the default boundaryx increases the optimal liquidation boundaryx * B chosen by debtholders, see Appendix C.1). This is because increasing the default boundary decreases the continuation value to debtholders and vice versa.
If equityholders could indirectly choose the liquidation boundaryx, which boundary would they choose if they ignored the direct effect on the value of equity via cash flows? This depends on whether the chosen default boundaryx is above or below x † given that the equity value at x † smooth pastes to zero.
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Ifx is above x † , then at the default boundaryx, the equity value is positive. This implies that the continuation value to equityholders is always positive in the default region. Since the liquidation payoff to equityholders is zero, they would therefore prefer a liquidation boundary as low as possible, i.e. the equity value would be decreasing in the liquidation boundary.
On the other hand, ifx is below x † , then at the default boundaryx, the equity value is negative. This implies that the continuation value of equityholders is negative in the default region. Since the liquidation payoff to equityholders is zero, they would therefore prefer a liquidation boundary as high as possible, i.e. the equity value would be increasing in the liquidation boundary.
Hence, if equityholders only consider the indirect effect of the default boundary on the value of equity via the liquidation boundary, they would choose a default boundary ofx = x † , as this would maximize the value of equity.
Given that there exists both a direct and an indirect effect, it follows that the optimal default threshold would lie between x † and a + b. In other words the optimal default threshold trades off the direct effect of the default boundary on equity via cash flows with the indirect effect on the value of equity via the liquidation boundary.
Intuitively, if default leads to instantaneous liquidation then the default decision is irreversible and hence it is optimal for equityholders to keep injecting liquidity until equity is worthless. However, if the default decision is not irreversible and furthermore if debtholders do not liquidate the firm immediately upon default but are willing to accept residual cash flows which are less than the promised coupon payments, then this gives an incentive to equityholders to default earlier.
Optimal liquidation boundary chosen by debtholders
It can be shown that the optimal liquidation boundaryx * B is below the default boundaryx, i.e. debtholders will tolerate some default before liquidating. The key assumption that drives is result is that the liquidation payoff to debtholders K is less than b r where the latter represents the value of receiving the coupon payments b forever.
An intuitive argument for why this is the case is as follows: The liquidation payoff to debtholders is K, so they will optimally liquidate once their continuation value falls to K. Since b r is the value of receiving the coupon b forever with probability 1, the continuation value can never be below Proof. See Appendix C.1.
Discussion
Unlike Leland (1994) where default is synonymous with liquidation, our model implies that default does not lead to immediate liquidation. Liquidation in our model occurs only when firm fundamentals fall sufficiently following a default by the equityholders. In a setup where default implies instantaneous liquidation, equityholders would have an incentive to inject relatively more liquidity compared to our setup in order to prevent liquidation.
As discussed in the introduction, recently, a number of papers including that of e.g. François and Morellec (2004) have modelled default in a setup where default does not imply immediate liquidation. As is the case in our model, in these models, equityholders inject less cash vis-a-vis the case of Leland (1994) and hence default occurs earlier. However, in these models the liquidation decision is determined exogenously.
13 For instance, in François and Morellec (2004) the firm is liquidated if the time spent in default (an observation period or grace period) exceeds an exogenously specified number of days. Thus liquidation happens with a certain exogenous probability once the equityholders default on the coupon payments. In contrast, in our model liquidation can happen at any time after default, provided that the cash flow of the firm falls sufficiently. Furthermore, in the model of François and Morellec (2004) , an increase in the anticipated length of the grace period reduces the probability of liquidation and hence equityholders' incentives to default earlier increases. However, in our model there is a positive relation between the default threshold and the liquidation boundary. As discussed earlier, this is the case because an earlier default reduces the probability of exiting default and thus lowers the continuation value of the debtholders. This in turn gives the debtholders an incentive to liquidate earlier.
14 Finally, it can be shown that the debtholders in our model have an incentive to liquidate the firm prematurely relative to the liquidation boundary that maximizes firm value, taking the default boundary as given. Sincex * > x † , the equity value is positive in the default region. However, the debtholders do not internalize the positive continuation value of equity when choosing their liquidation timing. Debtholders realize that even if the firm was restored to good health their upside would be limited by the level of the coupon b. Hence the debtholders' put option to liquidate is less valuable compared to that of a stakeholder which had residual rights to the cash flows associated with all claims on the firm in the no-default region. Debtholders therefore have an incentive to liquidate prematurely. This is formally stated in the following Proposition.
Proposition 5. For a givenx, there exists an optimal liquidation boundaryx * V that maximizes the value of the levered firm that satisfies the following inequality
Proof. See Appendix C.3.
Numerical analysis
We next study the numerical implications that our model has for the default and liquidation decisions, optimal capital structure and spreads. Regarding the choice of parametric values we follow François and Morellec (2004) as far as is feasible. We set the riskless interest rate to r = 6%, and the net tax advantage of debt to τ = 20%. Unless stated otherwise, we set the salary cost a = 1, the coupon b = 5, and the liquidation value K = 30. It can be shown that in our model, r − µ, plays the same role as the payout rate, and that the post-tax value of cash flows net of salary costs, (1 − τ ) x r−µ − a r can be interpreted as the going concern asset value. Since François and Morellec (2004) set the payout rate to 5% and the current asset value to 100, we therefore set µ = 1%, and the current cash flow x = 7.08. François and Morellec (2004) choose an asset value volatility of 20% in their base scenario; for simplicity, we set σ = 20% (which corresponds to a slightly higher volatility of the going concern asset value of around 23%). Finally, we set θ = 0.7, which amounts to a 12.5% reduction of (post-tax) cash flows in financial distress. In Figure 2 we illustrate how the optimal default and liquidation boundaries are determined. On the horizontal axis, we have different values for the default boundaryx while on the vertical axis, we have different values for the liquidation boundaryx. The solid line is the liquidation boundaryx * B (x) chosen by debtholders, taking the default boundaryx as given. Note that the solid line is upward sloping implying a positive relationship between default and liquidation thresholds. (In contrast, as discussed earlier, in the case of François and Morellec (2004) the exogenous probability of liquidation determines the default threshold chosen by equityholders.) The dashed lines depict combinations of the default and liquidation boundaries for which the value of equity is constant (iso-equity-13 value lines). Equity value is increasing for lower liquidation boundaries, and increasing for default boundaries closer to a + b = 5 (where b = 4 in this example). The equityholders, acting as Stackelberg leaders, choose a default boundaryx (which implies a choice of the liquidation boundaryx * B by the debtholders) that maximizes the value of equity; i.e. they pick the point onx * B (x) at which the iso-equity-value lines are just tangent to the solid line. For the given numerical example, this point is atx * = 4.81, which implies a liquidation boundary ofx * B = 2.28, as indicated in the figure. Numerically, it is clear here that for the given parameters, the direct effect ofx on the value of equity (via cash flows) is more important than the indirect effect (via changing the liquidation boundaryx * B ), producing a default boundary close to a + b rather than close to x † . Here, because default does not imply immediate liquidation (in fact, the distance betweenx * andx * B is quite large), equityholders care more about not injecting extra cash relative to liquidation timing.
For the given default and liquidation boundaries, leverage (defined as the proportion of debt value in total firm value) is around 49.72%. The spread, defined as b/B − r, is around 141 bp. The risk-neutral probability of hitting the default boundary within one year is around 5.8%, while the market recovery, defined as the value of debt at default as a fraction of face value (b/r) is around 66%. The risk-neutral probability of hitting the liquidation boundary is virtually nil, reflecting the very large distance between the default and the liquidation boundaries.
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This raises the question as to what determines the distance between the default and liquidation boundaries. A key determining feature here is the relationship between K, the liquidation value, and b/r, the face value of debt. When b/r is small in relation to K, debtholders have a strong incentive to liquidate early, which implies that equityholders have a strong incentive to delay default, and the distance will be small. Conversely, when b/r is large in relation to K, debtholders have a weak incentive to liquidate early, which implies that equityholders have a weak incentive to delay default, and the distance will be large. Taking into account both these effects we expect the distance between default and liquidation to be decreasing in K − b/r and vice versa. This is illustrated in Figure  3 , where we have kept K fixed at 30, but vary b.
As expected it can be seen from the Figure that the distance between the default boundary (solid line) and the liquidation boundary (dashed line) is small when b is small, tending to zero as b → rK = 1.8. In the limit when K = b/r, debtholders liquidate immediately upon default. This implies that equityholders will inject a lot of cash and liquidate only when the cash flow reaches x † = 2.5. Conversely, for large coupons of b = 5, debtholders have only weak incentives to liquidate early. Since they liquidate late anyway, the default boundary has only a very weak indirect effect via the liquidation boundary on the value of equity. The direct effect dominates, and equityholders choose to default very soon after the cash flow becomes negative (for x very close to a + b = 6).
In between the extreme values, raising b has two effects on the boundaries. Firstly, increasing b decreases the incentives of debtholders to liquidate early. This makes it easier for equityholders to default earlier. But if they default earlier, this in turn tends to raise the incentives of debtholders to liquidate early, unless the distance between the boundaries is already very large. This in turn tends to increase the incentives of debtholders to liquidate early. These overall effects are captured by Figure 3 . We next examine the issue of optimal capital structure in the ex ante sense of Leland (1994) , i.e. if an entrepreneur wants to exit the firm what should be the optimal mix of debt and equity that he should choose such that it maximizes the value of the proceeds. In other words, which value of b maximizes firm value?
In Figure 4 , we plot the firm value in our model (solid line), and compare this to the firm value in the case where default implies immediate liquidation (dashed line). We can see that for small values of b, when the distance between the default and liquidation boundaries is very small, the lines overlap. For large values of b, when the distance between default and liquidation is large, the solid line is much lower than the dashed line. In other words, for large b the firm value is much lower compared to the case where default and liquidation are synonymous. This is the case because an extra cost of financial distress is incurred in the states corresponding to the default region. Obviously, when default implies immediate liquidation, this cost is not incurred, leading to higher Given the agency cost of debt as well as the cost of financial distress the optimal amount of debt is much lower relative to the case in Leland (1994) . The optimal leverage implied by our model is 40.24% but it is 55.07% for the case where default is tantamount to liquidation as in Leland (1994) . The extra costs associated with debt have an adverse effect on the value of debt and this explains why the spreads implied by our model are higher compared to the case where default leads to instantaneous liquidation as can be seen in Figure 5 .
Conclusion
In much of the continuous-time debt pricing literature, it has been assumed that default is tantamount to liquidation, e.g. in the paper of Leland (1994) . Noting that in practice this is not the case, several more recent papers have separated the notions of default and liquidation, by defining liquidation to result when a firm spends an ex- ogenously specified time in default. These papers argue that this feature captures the essence of Chapter 11.
In this paper, we consider an alternative mechanism that allows a separation between the notions of default and liquidation: we allow debtholders to liquidate the firm, as long as equityholders are defaulting on coupon payments, while equity holders decide when to default, taking into account the effect of their actions on the debtholders' decision to liquidate. This assumption is more representative of environments in which debtholders have a strong influence over the timing of liquidation, like in the case of secured debt, or creditor-friendly bankruptcy regimes such as the one in the UK.
In our setup, debtholders do not liquidate immediately upon default. Nevertheless, debtholders have incentives to liquidate too early in the sense that they do not take into account the full continuation value to all claimants when making their decision. Since debtholders do not liquidate immediately upon default, shareholders can get away with some default, and default earlier relative to the case where default implies immediate liquidation as in the model of Leland (1994) . In our model, there are deadweight costs associated with default, implying that this early default reduces overall firm value. Both effects produce an agency cost of debt, which can lead to lower optimal leverage and higher spreads, as shown in a numerical example.
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The first derivative of B 2 (x;x,x) w.r.t.x is
The sign of this derivative will be equal to the sign of
Ax that produces a local maximum for B will be given by a root of this function, where the function needs to cross thex-axis from above.
There might be several local maxima. A set of sufficient conditions for single-crossing from above, belowx, ensuring a single optimalx * B <x, are : (1) f B (0) > 0, (2) f B (x) < 0, and (3) f B (x) < 0 forx ∈ [0,x). This just says that (1) for low enough cash flows, you do want to liquidate, (2) for high enough cash flows (x ≥x), you do not want to liquidate, and (3) the higher the cash flow, the less likely you are to want to liquidate.
It is obvious that conditions (1) and (2) are satisfied by a constant K < b r . To see that condition (3) is satisfied, take derivatives of f B (x):
.
(C.4)
We can now show that f B (x) = Q (x) + R B (x) < 0 in the relevant interval. Note initially that Q (0) + R B (0) < 0. We note that at the other endpointx =x, Q (x) + R B (x) ≤ 0 atx =x, with equality only for θ = 1, by Lemma 2.
Q(x) + R B (x) is either strictly concave, or strictly convex in [0,x): Q(x) is linear. If Z(θx) < 0, then R B (x) is strictly decreasing and concave in [0,x), if Z(θx) > 0, then R B (x) is strictly increasing and convex in [0,x) .
Since Q (x)+R B (x) is negative atx = 0, and non-positive atx =x, and Q(x)+R B (x) is either strictly convex or concave, Q(x)+R B (x) must be monotonic decreasing in [0,x) .
Effect ofx onx * B . We showed that f B (x) can be written as P (x) + Q(x) + R B (x), wherê x only appears in R B (x), and R B (x) is given by
Taking partial derivatives w.r.t.x, we see that
By Lemma 2, this will be positive for θx < a + b, zero for θx = a + b, and negative for θx > a + b. We can restrict attention to values ofx ≤ a+b θ : Ifx > a+b θ , this implies that 22 there are some levels of the cash flow x <x in the default region such that the residual cash flow that θx − a debtholders obtain in default is larger than the promised coupon payment b. In this case, the firm is clearly not defaulting on promised coupon payments, and anx > a+b θ is therefore meaningless. Sincex enters f B (x) only via R B (x), and since ∂f B (x) ∂x < 0 in the relevant interval, we obtain that
via the implicit function theorem.
Appendix C.2. Equity-value maximizing default boundaryx * In this subsection, we characterizex * via consideration of the total derivative of E w.r.t.x,
We initially consider the benchmark case of Leland (1994) , in which default equals liquidation, i.e.x =x. In this case, the total derivative above reduces to
Comparison to a standard assumption. A standard assumption in the literature, see e.g. Leland (1994) , is that the liquidation payoff is a fraction of the "asset value" of the firm. We show here that in the context of this assumption, it is difficult to talk meaningfully about optimal liquidation. Consider an unlevered firm, with a (traded) post-tax asset value ω, a fraction β of which is paid out as a flow to the owner. Suppose the evolution of ω under Q is described by the following SDE:
(ω plays the role that (1−τ )
x r−µ plays in our context.) Suppose that the firm is liquidated once ω hitsω, and that the liquidation payoff is (1 − λ)ω, where 0 < λ < 1. What is the value v(ω) of the unlevered firm?
The pricing ODE will be This is essentially the equation derived by Leland (1994) , except that here, the coupon payment set to zero (this is an unlevered firm). What is the optimal liquidation boundary in this case? By direct differentiation, it can be seen that the first derivative of v w.r.t.ω is
Note that since λ > 0, this is always negative. This means that it is never optimal to liquidate (this is of course also obvious by direct inspection of the pricing function). Clearly, with this type of corner solution, it is hard to discuss optimal liquidation.
K as a function of cash flow x. Let the liquidation payoff to debt be a function K(x) of the cash flow at liquidation,x. This means that the last boundary condition in the derivation of the prices needs to be modified in the obvious way. All resulting pricing formulas are essentially the same, with the constant K now replaced with the function K(x) everywhere.
We can repeat the derivations above to obtain new implicit functions f B (x) , f V (x) that determine the optimal liquidation boundaries. We have . (D.8)
There might be several local maxima, each associated with a root of these functions where the function crosses thex-axis from above. E.g. in the case of f B (x), a set of sufficient conditions for single-crossing from above, belowx, ensuring a single optimal x * B still is: (1) f B (0) > 0, (2) f B (x) < 0, and (3) f B (x) < 0 forx ∈ [0,x). This just says that (1) for low enough cash flows, you do want to liquidate, (2) for high enough cash flows (x ≥x), you do not want to liquidate, and (3) the higher the cash flow, the less likely you are to want to liquidate. These conditions implicitly put restrictions on the first and second derivatives of the function K(x).
We now show how these conditions relate to similar conditions that one would have to impose for an optimal liquidation boundaryx * U to exist for an unlevered firm. Let U denote the value of the unlevered firm. The holder of the unlevered firm receives cash flows (1 − τ )(x − a) until the firm is liquidated at cash flowx, when she receives K(x). The pricing ODE is . (D.13) Ax * U that produces a local maximum for U will be given by a root of this function, where the function needs to cross thex-axis from above.
Comparing f U (x) with f V (x) and f B (x), we can see that they are very similar. Reasonable conditions on K(x) that ensure the existence and uniqueness of an optimal liquidation boundaryx * U that maximizes the value of the unlevered firm imply that (1) and (3) are going to be satisfied for f B (x), and hence also f V (x). An additional assumption on K(x) is then still needed to ensure thatx B <x. This would be the analogue of the assumption K < b r , i.e. that debt is risky.
